

WASHINGTON TIMES
11 September 1986

Resolving the Daniloff dilemma

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

New rules we can apply to the game

I think it's time to throw in the towel in the case of Nicholas Daniloff. We cannot allow him to be jailed for six months or longer, as the Soviets threaten to do if the United States doesn't release the Soviet spy, Gennady Zakharov, caught red-handed and now in our custody. There simply is no way out for the United States government other than to expel the Soviet agent in return for Mr. Daniloff's freedom.

But that should not be the end of the story. In fact, it should be the beginning of a new relationship with an old and unappeasable enemy, a beginning based on the realization that Josef V. Stalin is alive and well as the invisible divinity at the Politburo altar.

Until now the United States has permitted an abundance of Soviet and Soviet-bloc citizens to wander about freely with few enforceable restrictions against their travels in this country. Until now, the United States has taken a fairly laissez-faire attitude toward economic arrangements between the Soviet Union and American corporations. As soon as the Daniloff-Zakharov ex-

change is completed, the U.S. government and our free institutions should announce the following steps:

1. Radio and television networks ought to cancel any scheduled appearances of Joe Adamov, Vladimir Posner, Georgi Arbatov, and other Soviet propagandists who are always welcomed to cuttlefish the atmosphere.

The network boycott against these and other Soviet spokesmen ought to continue for a long while after Mr. Daniloff is freed.

2. Reduce Soviet Embassy and consulate personnel by at least half. If the U.S.S.R. retaliates by order-

ing similar cuts in U.S. Embassy and consulate personnel in Moscow and Leningrad, so what? Our people in the U.S.S.R. are under such restrictions and police supervision anyway as to make our present diplomatic representation of limited value.

3. Cut the Soviet staff to the U.N. Mission.

Earlier this year the State Department ordered a drop from 275 to 170 in the number of Soviet citizens assigned to the United Nations mission. The 38 percent cut ought to be at least raised to 50 percent. Those from Soviet bloc countries ought also to be cut drastically. The Cuban U.N. mission has more personnel than that of the United Kingdom.

4. Similar cuts ought to be made in the number of Soviet appointees to the U.N. staff itself. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported in May 1985 that at least a quarter of the Soviets in the U.N. Secretariat are intelligence officers "and many more are co-opted by the KGB and GRU [Soviet military intelligence]."

5. The same restrictions on Soviet citizens listed above ought to be extended to Soviet-bloc representatives.

The FBI has reported that Soviet intelligence officers at the United Nations also run the intelligence services of all East European satellites as well as Soviet-bloc countries such as Cuba, all of whom report to the KGB. The restrictions which now exist against Soviet satellite diplomats, for some strange reason, do not apply to diplomats from Hungary and Romania, "a serious oversight, since their intelligence services," wrote the Heritage Foundation's Thomas E.L. Dewey, "also cooperate closely with the KGB."

6. Cut drastically the number of media correspondents from the U.S.S.R. and Soviet-bloc countries.

7. Private organizations such as the American Political Science Association, the American Bar Association, and similar bodies which in the past have involved themselves with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union ought to end those relationships.

8. Reconsider our economic and financial relations with the U.S.S.R., especially export controls.

Most recently, the United States has sold wheat to the Kremlin at sub-

sidized, giveaway prices. We ought to examine the workings of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, whose joint effort is devoted to facilitating trade expansion between the two countries. Anthony C. Sutton's just-published *The Best Enemy Money Can Buy* tells a shocking story of how American business helps the Soviet enemy.

These are only some of the measures which the U.S. government ought to take after the Daniloff-Zakharov exchange is made.

For the moment, we're trapped into playing the game on Soviet terms. There's no reason why we have to play their game after the exchange.

And if the argument is raised that such reprisals against the U.S.S.R. would jeopardize the projected sum-

mit meeting between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, what kind of a summit would it be if it began on Soviet terms?

By now, I think it will be realized by everybody except perhaps Armand Hammer & Co. and *Newsweek* magazine (Mr. Gorbachev's "promise for the future is that he may turn out to be something a bit better than the old men he succeeded," was the last sentence in the magazine's cover story March 25, 1985) that Mr. Gorbachev's Russia is little different from the Russia of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. In fact, the Gorbachev regime may be the worst from the standpoint of world peace than any since Stalin's.

We should be prepared for the worst.